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Abstract
This paper studies whether mergers may lead to partial tacit collu-
sion, thereby having the potential to induce simultaneous coordinated
and non-coordinated eﬀects. We use a Bertrand-Edgeworth model
with heterogeneous discount factors to derive conditions for proﬁtable
and stable collusion and provide a numerical example. Mergers that
change the market structure in a way such that maverick ﬁrms are
eliminated or colluding ﬁrms reach a critical share in total capacity
can lead to partial collusion.
Keywords: Partial Collusion, Tacit Collusion, Mergers, Coordinated
Eﬀects, Non-coordinated Eﬀects, Umbrella Eﬀects
1 Introduction
A merger can induce anti-competitive eﬀects by lowering the intensity of
competition in a market such that ﬁrms may charge higher prices even if
they do not coordinate their behaviour. This eﬀect is known as the non-
coordinated eﬀect of a merger. However, a merger may also cause coordinated
eﬀects where ﬁrms tacitly collude post-merger and behave similarly to an
explicit cartel.
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In this paper, we study whether a merger in an oligopolistic market –
that is, where no collusion either tacit or explicit is possible – may induce
some ﬁrms in the market to tacitly collude post-merger. Stated otherwise,
we analyse mergers that cause only some ﬁrms to coordinate their behaviour
while, simultaneously, other ﬁrms behave competitively. Hence, coordinated
and non-coordinated eﬀects would occur at the same time without prior col-
lusion. This ﬁnding stands in contrast to the literature, which has treated
coordinated and non-coordinated eﬀects either as separate eﬀects or with the
assumption that collusion already exists prior to the merger.
The analysis is related to studies of partial cartels, which are characterised
by only some ﬁrms entering an explicit cartel agreement while the outsiders
react to the increased prices charged by the cartel members by raising their
prices as well, causing so-called umbrella eﬀects. The main diﬀerence between
the analysis carried out here and studies of partial cartels is that in our model
the merger of two ﬁrms induces collusion in a market that was competitive
before the ﬁrms merged.
To analyse the simultaneous occurrence of coordinated and non-coordi-
nated eﬀects of a merger, it is expedient to distinguish between unilateral
eﬀects of a merger, where only the merging ﬁrms are considered, and non-
coordinated eﬀects. While the former is an out-of-equilibrium eﬀect, the
latter considers the change in the Nash equilibrium of the oligopoly game
caused by the merger. Coordinated and unilateral eﬀects are assumed to be
mutually exclusive in general (Fabra and Motta 2013, p. 12; implicitly in
Gore et al. 2015, p. 320) because the merged ﬁrm either charges the price
resulting from coordinated behaviour or it charges the optimal price in the
new Nash equilibrium.
If coordinated and non-coordinated eﬀects are considered, exclusiveness
is not necessarily given anymore. Coordinated eﬀects have been studied
in several papers with all-inclusive collusion (Compte et al. 2002; Vascon-
celos 2005) or partial cartels (Escrihuela-Villar 2008; Bos and Harrington
2010). The ﬁrst strand of the literature studies the change in the smallest
discount factor that is needed to sustain collusion. Because the collusion
is all-inclusive, non-coordinated eﬀects cannot emerge. The second strand
shows indeed that coordinated and non-coordinated eﬀects occur simultan-
eously. The eﬀects of a merger are, however, analysed under the assumption
that a cartel exists already prior to the merger (see for example Bos and
Harrington 2010, p. 104).
The literature on the connection between partial cartels and umbrella
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eﬀects discusses the circumstances under which umbrella eﬀects may arise
(Inderst et al. 2014) and the legal context of umbrella eﬀects (Hansberry et
al. 2014; R. Blair et al. 2016; R. D. Blair and Durrance 2018). An experiment,
which is based on the model used in Bos and Harrington (2010), conﬁrms
that partial cartels charge prices above the competitive level and that outside
ﬁrms react to this behaviour by raising prices as well. Mergers are reported
to have no signiﬁcant eﬀects on prices, however (Gomez Martinez 2017).
Partial tacit collusion caused by a merger might be present in the Ger-
man cement market. After the German cement cartel broke down in 2002,
a period of intense competition characterised by low prices followed. On
27.09.2004, the German cement company Cemex took over Readymix, a pro-
ducer of ready-mixed concrete in Du¨sseldorf-Wersten in Germany. Readymix
was part of the RMC Group plc, a public limited company located in the
United Kingdom. Following the takeover, the price index for cement in-
creased drastically. In a sector inquiry, the German Federal Cartel Oﬃce
(FCO) showed that this industry is indeed susceptible to collusion (Bundes-
kartellamt 2017, p. 129). The FCO announced that 12 of 15 ﬁrms could be
persuaded to stop communicating price increases to competitors (Bundeskar-
tellamt 2018). Not all ﬁrms took part in this practice, however. It has been
reported that those ﬁrms which announced prices covered 93% of the German
cement market. This outcome can be seen as a form of partial collusion.
The paper is organised as follows: In section 2, we introduce a modiﬁed
version of the Bertrand-Edgeworth model of endogenous cartel formation
(Bos and Harrington 2010) where ﬁrms are characterised by heterogeneous
discount factors. We derive conditions for partial tacit collusion in section 3.
In section 4, conditions for the existence of stable collusion are derived. The
link to mergers is drawn in section 5. A numerical example that illustrates
the point is given in section 6. The last section concludes.
2 Model
We consider an oligopolistic market and a homogeneous product where capacity-
constrained ﬁrms compete with prices. This Bertrand-Edgeworth setting in
Bos and Harrington (ibid.) is modiﬁed by allowing for heterogeneous discount
factors.
Consider a set of ﬁrms I := {1, ..., n}. Each ﬁrm i ∈ I seeks to maximise
its proﬁt. The market demand for the homogeneous good depends on the
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price p ∈ R+ and is given by D(p) := a − bp, where a, b > 0. Each ﬁrm i
simultaneously chooses a price pi from the set Pi := {0, , . . . , c−, c, c+, . . .},
where  > 0. Furthermore, each ﬁrm i faces the individual demand function
Di(pi, p−i), where pi denotes the price of ﬁrm i and p−i denotes the prices of
all other ﬁrms.
All ﬁrms produce using the same technology characterised by marginal
costs of c ≥ 0. There are no ﬁxed costs. Each ﬁrm i has a capacity
ki ∈ (0, D(c)/2) which gives the maximum possible output and is charac-
terised by a discount factor δi := 2ki/D(c). As pointed out in Harrington
(1989, p. 292), possible explanations for diﬀerences in discount factors may
be capital market imperfections, conglomerates internally allocating funds to
subsidiary enterprises or principal-agent problems with regards to the design
of contracts for managers. The link between discount factors and capacities,
in particular, is drawn to take into account the so-called small stock eﬀect
according to which smaller ﬁrms have higher rates of total returns on average
compared to larger ﬁrms (Banz 1981; Fama and French 1993). This implies
that investors use higher capitalisation rates for smaller ﬁrms. Though some
studies challenged the eﬀect (Dijk 2011), recent studies support the existence
of the small stock eﬀect (Asness et al. 2018; Ciliberti et al. 2019).
The sum of all capacities is called K :=
∑n
i ki and is assumed to be
ﬁxed. The capacities and discount factors of individual ﬁrms are assumed to
change only in the case of a merger. Firms maximise their proﬁts given by
πi(pi, p−i) := (pi − c)Di(pi, p−i). The stage game can thus be described by
Γ := (I, (Pi)i∈I , (πi)i∈I).
For the following assumptions with respect to demand, Ω(p) := {j :
pj = p} is the set of ﬁrms that charge a price of p. Additionally, pmin−i :=
min{p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pn} is the minimum of all prices except that of ﬁrm
i. 2.1 describes the behaviour of the individual demand if the price of ﬁrm i
approaches the lowest price among its competitors from above. In this case,
its individual demand is equal to market demand at price pmin−i net of the
capacities of all ﬁrms that price at pmin−i .
Assumption 2.1.
lim
η→0+
Di(p
min
−i + η, p−i) = max
⎧⎨
⎩D(pmin−i )−
∑
j∈Ω(pmin−i )
kj, 0
⎫⎬
⎭ .
2.2 describes that if some ﬁrms price at p and if these ﬁrms have excess ca-
pacity in sum, then each of these ﬁrms individually must face excess capacity.
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Secondly, it describes that if demand for some ﬁrms is non-negative, then the
individual demand of each of these ﬁrms is non-negative. This ensures that,
among ﬁrms charging the same price, demand is distributed equally to at
least some extent.
Assumption 2.2.
0 <
∑
i∈Ω(p)
Di(pi, p−i) <
∑
i∈Ω(p)
ki, then 0 < Di(pi, p−i) < ki, ∀i ∈ Ω(p).
2.3 describes that no ﬁrm i has enough capacity to meet the demand at
the monopoly price pm := (a+ bc)/2b.
Assumption 2.3. ki < D(p
m).
2.4 assures that every combination of n− 1 ﬁrms has enough capacity to
meet the demand at the competitive price p = c.
Assumption 2.4.
∑
j =i kj ≥ D(c), ∀i.
The stage game Γ is repeated inﬁnitely. Now, it is possible that a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium exists that consists of a set of ﬁrms that tacitly
collude. Firms are assumed to use a grim trigger strategy (Friedman 1971),
where defection is punished by inﬁnite Nash reversion. Such a set of colluding
ﬁrms can be described by a combination of at least two ﬁrms, as in 2.1.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A set κ ∈ K, where K := {S ∈ P(I) | |S| ≥ 2} is called a
collusive set.
The sum of the capacities of the members of a collusive set is referred to
as Kκ(κ) :=
∑
i∈κ ki and the sum of capacity of ﬁrms that are not part of the
collusive set is referred to as Ko(κ) :=
∑
j∈I\κ kj to simplify the notation.
3 Collusive Price
Consider ﬁrst the stage game Γ. There are two Nash equilibria. The ﬁrst
consists of pi = c ∀i ∈ I with πi = 0 ∀i ∈ I. The second consists of
pi = c +  ∀i ∈ I. As  → 0, pi → c ∀i ∈ I and πi → 0 ∀i ∈ I. Any
other price leaves the proﬁts unchanged at best.
If the game is repeated inﬁnitely often, it may be proﬁtable for ﬁrms to
tacitly collude. We start with the optimal response of ﬁrms that are not
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part of the collusive set. An outside ﬁrm will not ﬁnd it optimal to charge
a price above that of the collusive set as no demand exists. A price that is
signiﬁcantly lower than the collusive price may not be optimal as well. If
the outside ﬁrm is capacity constrained, it can achieve a higher proﬁt by
raising its price, ultimately charging a price just below the collusive price.
This result is depicted in 3.1.
Lemma 3.1. Assume a collusive set κ charging the price pκ > c + . If∑
j /∈κ kj ≤ D(pκ), then the equilibrium price for a non-colluding ﬁrm is pj :=
pκ −  ∀j /∈ κ.
All proofs are contained in Appendix A. A collusive ﬁrm i ∈ κ is assumed
to earn a share of the collusive proﬁt proportional to its share in the capacity
of the collusive set.1 The net present value of its share is
Vi(p, κ) :=
(
1
1− δi
)
(p− c) [D(p)−Ko(κ)] ki
Kκ(κ)
.
It is assumed that the collusive set maximises the sum of net present
values under the constraint that no ﬁrm in this set has an incentive to defect
from the collusive price. A ﬁrm proﬁtably deviates from the collusive price
by undercutting it. As all ﬁrms will charge prices equal to marginal cost
(or  above it) after a defection occurs, the defecting ﬁrm obtains a positive
proﬁt only in the period in which defection occurs (and, of course, before it
defects). Optimally, the defecting ﬁrm undercuts the collusive price by  if
it is capacity constrained at this price or otherwise undercuts the collusive
price by 2 and so forth. These prices are approximately equal to the collusive
price. With the knowledge on the proﬁt of a collusive set member that is
defecting, we are able to determine the incentive compatibility constraint.
A ﬁrm has no incentive to deviate from the collusive price if the stream of
proﬁts it obtains by adhering to the collusive price is higher or equal to that
obtained by defection. Taking this into account, the maximisation problem
of the collusive set is given by
max
p
V (p, κ) :=
∑
i∈κ
Vi(p, κ)
1Bos and Harrington (2010, p. 97) mention Ro¨ller and Steen (2006, p. 322) among
others to support this assumption.
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subject to the incentive compatibility constraint
Vi(p, κ) ≥ (p− c)ki ∀i ∈ κ.
The solution of the unconstrained maximisation problem is
pˆ(κ) =
a+ bc−Ko
2b
.
Solving the constraint for p gives
p¯(κ) =
−K +Kκ(κ)δi + a
b
∀i ∈ κ. (1)
There are several important aspects to notice here. First, if the constraint
is binding, the collusive proﬁt is maximised by charging the highest price
that satisﬁes the incentive compatibility constraint. Therefore, Equation 1
is written as equality. Second, the lowest value of the constrained price
is equal to marginal cost. This price satisﬁes the incentive compatibility
constraint. The colluding ﬁrms would, of course, not make positive proﬁts
in this case. The third feature refers to the discount factors of the collusive
ﬁrms. As the incentive compatibility constraint could be diﬀerent for all
ﬁrms, it is suﬃcient to look at the ﬁrm with the smallest discount factor (or
– as it deﬁnes the size of the discount factor – the smallest capacity) in order
to ﬁnd the lowest value the condition on the right side in Equation 1 can
take. To this end, let δmin(κ) := min(δi)i∈κ be the smallest discount factor
among the members of the collusive set κ and kmin(κ) := min(ki)i∈κ the
smallest capacity among the members of κ. If Equation 1 holds for δmin(κ)
(or kmin(κ)), then it holds for all other members of κ as well.
The proﬁt maximising price p∗(κ) given the constraint is then the min-
imum of pˆ(κ) and p¯(κ), so p∗(κ) := min {pˆ(κ), p¯(κ)}.
Given the optimal prices, the net present values may be restated as
V (κ) =
{
(D(c)−Ko)2
∑
i∈κ
1
1−δi
4b
p¯(κ) ≥ pˆ(κ)∑
i∈κ− (δmin(κ)−1)(−Kκ(κ)δmin(κ)+K−D(c))kib(δi−1) pˆ(κ) > p¯(κ)
(2)
Before continuing with the analysis of the two cases in Equation 2, we
deﬁne a proﬁtable collusive set in 3.1. The term requires the net present
value of a collusive set to be positive.
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Deﬁnition 3.1. A collusive set κ is called proﬁtable if V (κ) > 0.
It is easy to see in Equation 2 that if the constraint is not binding, the
proﬁt of collusion is always positive. Whether the unconstrained proﬁt is
positive or not ultimately depends, via the discount factors, on the capacities
of the collusion as described in 3.2.
Lemma 3.2. If kmin(κ) > k¯min(κ) :=
D(c)
2
(
1− D(c)−Ko(κ)
Kκ(κ)
)
holds, the proﬁt
of a collusive set κ, for which the incentive compatibility constraint is binding,
is positive.
The criterion described in 3.2 shows a familiar expression with D(c)/2
being the demand at the monopoly price. This value is reduced by the term
that follows. One part of that term is the ratio of the residual demand of
the collusive set at the competitive price per unit of collusive capacity. In
analysing changes of the condition, we should keep in mind that a change in
κ has an impact on the capacity of collusive members and on the capacity of
collusive outsiders. Separating these two eﬀects would violate the assumption
that the total capacity is ﬁxed. We can state, however, that an additional
member in the collusive set leads to a larger ratio as long as the residual
demand at competitive prices is lower than the collusive capacity. A larger
ratio in turn leads to a lower k¯min(κ). While it is true that the threshold
for the proﬁtability of collusion decreases if it controls more capacity, this
additional member in the collusive set perhaps has a capacity that is below
the condition and renders the collusion unproﬁtable.
The next step is to determine whether the constraint is binding or not.
Consider, therefore, the diﬀerence between the unconstrained price pˆ(κ) and
the price resulting from the constraint p¯(κ). If this diﬀerence is negative, the
constraint is not binding because p¯(κ) > pˆ(κ). 3.3 describes the condition
that determines whether the constraint is binding or not.
Lemma 3.3. If kmin(κ) ≥ kˆmin(κ) := D(c)2
(
1− D(c)−Ko(κ)
2Kk
)
holds, the incent-
ive compatibility constraint for a collusive set κ is not binding.
3.1 provides a condition for the case where the constraint is always bind-
ing. The condition may be derived by using the upper limit of the capacity
of a ﬁrm described in 2.4.
Corollary 3.1. If Ko(κ) > D(c) holds, the constraint for collusive set κ is
always binding.
8
A collusive set κ with Ko(κ) > D(c) will, however, never be formed as
any collusive price above c+  would be proﬁtably undercut by outside ﬁrms,
leaving the collusive set without any demand because outsiders would control
enough capacity to satisfy any demand at a price p ≥ c. It can be concluded,
however, that if Ko(κ) ≤ D(c), then the constraint is not always binding.
After all, the smallest capacity among collusion members ultimately deﬁnes
whether the constraint is binding or not; a result that holds even when all
ﬁrms participate in the collusion.
The previous results are now used to determine the lowest value of kmin(κ)
that deﬁnes whether collusion is proﬁtable or not. We already know when
the collusive proﬁt is positive, either from 3.2 or from the fact that the
unconstrained collusive proﬁt cannot become negative. By using 3.3, we can
identify the situation where the constraint is not binding for a collusive set.
Comparing the two conditions leads to 3.4.
Lemma 3.4. If D(c) > Ko(κ) holds, kˆmin(κ) > k¯min(κ).
This result states that the condition for proﬁtable collusion where the in-
centive compatibility constraint is binding is always lower than the condition
that identiﬁes a situation where the constraint is not binding for a collusive
set. We use this to state properties of collusive sets that do not operate
proﬁtably in the sense that their proﬁt would be negative.
Lemma 3.5. If kmin(κ) ≤ k¯min(κ) holds, pˆ(κ) > p¯(κ) ≤ c.
So far, we know when a collusive set is bound by the incentive compat-
ibility constraint and when it operates proﬁtably. Proﬁtability, however, is
just one aspect we need to analyse in order to determine whether collusion
will emerge or not. Stability also plays a crucial role and will be addressed
in the next section.
4 Collusive Stability
Following D’Aspremont et al. (1983), a cartel or, in the context considered
here, collusion is considered stable if it is internally and externally stable.
Internal stability is given if no cartel member ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate.
External stability prevails if no ﬁrm that is not a member of a cartel has an
incentive to join the cartel. Formally, the set of all stable collusive sets can
be described by 4.1.
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Deﬁnition 4.1. A collusive set is called stable if it is an element of the set
S := {κ ∈ K | (1− δi)Vi (p(κ)) > ki (p(κ \ {i})− c) ∀i ∈ κ ∧
kj (p(κ)− c) > (1− δi)Vj (p(κ ∪ {i})) ∀j ∈ N \ κ}.
A critical relation between proﬁtable collusive sets and stable collusive
sets may be established using the algorithm developed in D’Aspremont et al.
(1983, p. 22) and apply it to collusive sets.2 The algorithm starts with the
smallest cartel (in our case, a proﬁtable collusive set consisting of two ﬁrms).
This cartel is internally stable. If it is externally stable, then there is a stable
cartel. If it is not externally stable, then at least one of the next larger cartels
must be internally stable and so on up to the point where, in the last case,
the monopoly cartel is stable. In 4.1, this algorithm is used to ﬁnd at least
one stable collusive set among proﬁtable collusive sets.
Lemma 4.1. If there is at least one proﬁtable collusive set κ, then S 
= ∅.
With the knowledge on the proﬁtability and stability of collusive sets, the
inﬂuence of a merger may be analysed. We turn to this topic in the next
section.
5 Eﬀects of a Merger
A merger is assumed to take place between exactly two ﬁrms. Several eﬀects
follow. First, the number of ﬁrms is reduced by one. Second, the capacity of
the new ﬁrm is calculated as the sum of the capacities of the merging ﬁrms.
As the merged ﬁrm now has a larger capacity than the any of the ﬁrms
which merged, the discount factor of this ﬁrm is updated accordingly, again
reﬂecting the already mentioned small stock eﬀect. Mergers are formally
described in 5.1.
Deﬁnition 5.1. Assume two ﬁrms m, a ∈ I. A merger between ﬁrm m and
a to ﬁrm ma has three eﬀects:
1. I ′ := {ma} ∪ I \ {m, a}
2. kma := km + ka
2The authors use a model of symmetrical ﬁrms.
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3. δma :=
2(km+ka)
D(c)
Whether a collusive set may operate proﬁtably depends on the smallest
capacity among its members and the capacity that the collusive set controls.
Contrary to Bos and Harrington (2010, p. 104), where a merger without a
prior cartel never leads to a cartel, in this model, a merger may lead to partial
collusion. The reason for this is that, in this model, a merger changes not only
the capacities of ﬁrms but also the discount factors. The discount factors,
in turn, have an inﬂuence on proﬁt and, therefore, on the proﬁtability of a
collusive set. As discount factors and capacities are linked, a merger either
may raise the smallest capacity among a collusive set or raise the capacity
that a collusive set controls. This process is summarised in 5.1.
Proposition 5.1. If kmin(κ) is suﬃciently close to k¯min(κ), then a merger
may lead to (partial) collusion.
The link for the ﬁrst type of merger is rather straightforward. In the sense
of Baker (2002), a merger may serve the goal of eliminating a maverick ﬁrm,
which, in this case, is the ﬁrm with the smallest capacity among potential
colluding ﬁrms. Through the takeover of such a maverick ﬁrm, some collus-
ive sets may become proﬁtable. More problematic are mergers where some
ﬁrms merge, and this aﬀects a third maverick ﬁrm because the condition for
proﬁtability of collusion changes. As the maverick ﬁrm is not involved in the
merger, it is harder to draw a connection between a merger and collusion.
The next section provides a numerical example, demonstrating the eﬀects
of a merger that we just analysed and showing the implications for prices,
proﬁts and welfare.
6 Numerical Example
This example shows that if ﬁrms have heterogeneous capacities and hetero-
geneous discount factors, a merger can lead to partial collusion. Consider
the market demand function
D(p) = 1− p. (3)
Assume that there are seven ﬁrms in the market all competing with prices
and producing with marginal cost c = 0 and without ﬁxed costs. To simplify
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2.2, in this example, we assume that the excess capacity or demand that each
ﬁrm faces is proportional to its capacity and that market share is based on
capacity. Capacity, discount factors, market share and proﬁts of ﬁrms for
this situation are given in Table 1.3
Firm ki δi Market share πi
0 0.47 0.94 0.2017 0
1 0.41 0.82 0.1760 0
2 0.39 0.78 0.1674 0
3 0.39 0.78 0.1674 0
4 0.25 0.50 0.1073 0
5 0.22 0.44 0.944 0
6 0.20 0.40 0.858 0
Table 1: Pre-merger market
Using 3.4 and 3.3, the respective conditions for collusion are depicted in
Figure 1.4 The bars represent the minimal capacities of a collusive set kmin(κ).
The solid line represents the proﬁtability condition k¯min(κ), and the dashed
line represents the condition concerning the constraint for a collusive set
kˆmin(κ). Colluding ﬁrms operate proﬁtably as soon as the smallest capacity
meets the proﬁtability condition. Visually, this would be the case if a bar
and the solid line intersect. As can be seen, there are no proﬁtable collusive
sets pre-merger. Therefore, the pre-merger Nash equilibrium consists of all
ﬁrms pricing at marginal cost and proﬁts of zero.
Consider now a merger between the ﬁrms with k5 = 0.22 and k6 = 0.20.
The capacities and discount factors of all other ﬁrms remain unchanged.
Table 2 shows the distribution of capacities, discount factors, market shares
and proﬁts after the merger. Pre-merger, the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index
may vary between 1/7 ≈ .0.143 and 1, taking the value of H = 0.155. After
the merger, the index may vary between 1/6 ≈ .0.167 and takes on the
value of H ′ = 0.172. One could argue that the change in market shares
and in the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index do not raise serious concerns about
anti-competitive eﬀects of this merger.
However, exactly one set of ﬁrms could proﬁtably raise the price above
3Note that the index which is used to address ﬁrms starts with 0.
4Only collusive sets for which D(c) −Ko(κ) ≥ 0 holds true are depicted, as otherwise
collusion can never be proﬁtable.
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Figure 1: Pre-merger kmin(κ) and conditions
Firm k′i δ
′
i Market share π
′
i
0 0.47 0.94 0.2017 0.0302
1 0.42 0.84 0.1803 0.0270
2 0.41 0.82 0.1760 0.0264
3 0.39 0.78 0.1674 0.0251
4 0.39 0.78 0.1674 0.0251
5 0.25 0.50 0.1073 0.0731
Table 2: Post-merger market
the competitive level. That set is called κ∗ = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. The respective
collusive price is p∗(κ∗) = 0.29. As it is the only proﬁtable collusive set, it
is stable according to 4.1. This is depicted in Figure 2.5 Whenever κ∗ is
reduced by any one ﬁrm, the resulting collusive price is zero. Therefore, κ∗
is internally stable. Analogously, the only proper superset of κ∗ is not able
to operate proﬁtably. With external stability given as well, κ∗ is the only
5Again, only collusive sets for which D(c)−Ko(κ) ≥ 0 are considered.
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stable collusive set and therefore is unique.
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Figure 2: Post-merger kmin(κ) and conditions
Pre-merger, total welfare stemmed solely from the consumer surplus amount-
ing to CS = 0.5. Post-merger, the collusive set obtained a per-period proﬁt
of PS ′κ = 0.1338 while the proﬁt of the outside ﬁrms was PS
′
o = 0.0731. The
consumer surplus was CS ′ = 0.2503. Overall welfare decreased such that
ΔW = −0.0428 which corresponds to 8.6 %.
An additional interesting feature arises if the proﬁts of all ﬁrms are com-
pared. Though all ﬁrms earned a positive proﬁt after the merger, the ﬁrm
which was not part of the collusive set had the highest proﬁt. This could
be interpreted as another variant of the merger paradox that, in this model,
applies to partial tacit collusion as well.
7 Conclusion
Mergers can lead to partial collusion where some ﬁrms coordinate their be-
haviour, and some ﬁrms merely react to the new situation, as was shown
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in an inﬁnitely repeated Bertrand-Edgeworth game with heterogeneous dis-
count factors. A merger potentially aﬀects capacities and discount factors of
ﬁrms in a competetive market such that collusion becomes proﬁtable. It is
clear that coordinated eﬀects and non-coordinated eﬀects may occur simul-
taneously if a merger allows an already existing cartel to raise prices further.
This paper shows, however, that an existing cartel is not a precondition for
a merger to lead to partial simultaneous coordinated and non-coordinated
eﬀects.
A numerical example was provided, showing that a merger could lead
to partial collusion. Simply comparing market shares or the Herﬁndahl-
Hirschman Index would not raise any serious concerns about the merger,
while the partial collusion that emerged indeed had a negative eﬀect on total
welfare.
Some implications may be drawn. Though collusion is treated in both the
European and U.S. Merger Guidelines, it may be worth considering partial
collusion as a follow-up phenomenon of a merger more explicitly. The eco-
nomic environment, especially regarding market share, may be unsuitable for
a cartel or collusion involving all ﬁrms. It may, however, be just suitable for
partial collusion, which could cause considerable economic damage. Mergers
in which maverick ﬁrms are eliminated from the market are equally suitable
to promote partial collusion as mergers between two ﬁrms that seem to be
unrelated. A practical example of the former can be found in the develop-
ments of the German cement market. After the takeover of what can be
seen as the maverick ﬁrm Readymix which deviated from the prior cartel
agreement, partial tacit collusion emerged.
The analysis showed that, in addition to heterogeneous capacities, hetero-
geneous discount factors are necessary for a merger in a copmetetive market
to lead to partial collusion. Lessening the assumptions on demand, costs
and discount factors would further increase the applicability of the model.
After all, a model which may theoretically predict the actual outcome of a
merger would be very useful. With such a model, the process of accepting
or rejecting a merger would be greatly improved.
A Proofs
3.1. Outside ﬁrms may earn positive proﬁts by charging the collusive price
pκ as well. Assume now that a single ﬁrm charges a price pj > p(κ). This
15
approach is not proﬁtable as, according to 2.4, ﬁrm i would see no demand.
Assume next that a set of at least two outside ﬁrms Ω(po) charge a price
po > p(κ). Each ﬁrm in Ω(po) may now raise its proﬁt by undercutting po
by . When  → 0, the proﬁt margin virtually stays the same while the
demand increases substantially. As po is the highest price, the ﬁrms in Ω(po)
must have excess capacity and would proﬁt from undercutting the price po.
Charging a price po > p(κ) therefore cannot result in an equilibrium. Assume
now that all outside ﬁrms charge a price of po = p(κ) − . If
∑
j /∈κ kj ≤
D(p(κ)), then no single outside ﬁrm and no group of outside ﬁrms has an
incentive to undercut the price po. While the proﬁt margin would decrease, no
additional demand could be attracted as the outside ﬁrms already produce
up to capacity. Undercutting the price of po = p(κ) −  cannot result in
an equilibrium. If outside ﬁrms charge the collusive price p(κ), they would
share demand with the collusive set, and proﬁts would thereby decrease. If∑
j /∈κ kj ≤ D(p(κ)), the equilibrium price of outsiders, therefore, is po =
p(κ)− .
3.1. It is assumed that ki ∈ (0, D(c)). If kmin(κ) ≥ D(c)2 , then no capacity sat-
isﬁes the condition for an unconstrained optimisation of the collusive proﬁt.
This is the case if
kˆmin(κ) =
D(c)
2
(
1− D(c)−Ko(κ)
2Kκ(κ)
)
>
D(c)
2
Ko(κ) > D(c).
3.2.
V (p¯(κ)) =
m∑
i=1
−(δmin(κ)− 1) (−Kκ(κ)δmin(κ) +K −D(c)) ki
b (δi − 1)
is positive if the second parenthesis in the numerator is negative, so
−Kκ(κ)δmin(κ) +K −D(c) < 0
δmin(κ)Kκ(κ) > K −D(c).
Substituting the smallest discount factor with the respective capacity yields
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2kmin(κ)
D(c)
Kκ(κ) > K −D(c)
kmin(κ) >
D(c)(K −D(c))
2Kκ(κ)
kmin(κ) >
D(c)
2
Kκ(κ) +Ko(κ)−D(c)
Kκ(κ)
kmin(κ) > k¯min(κ) :=
D(c)
2
(
1− D(c)−Ko(κ)
Kκ(κ)
)
which is the condition stated in 3.2.
3.3. The diﬀerence between the two prices is non-positive if
0 ≥ pˆ− p¯
0 ≥ a+ bc−Ko(κ)
2b
− −K +Kκ(κ)δmin(κ) + a
b
δmin(κ) ≥ K +Kκ(κ)−D(c)
2Kκ(κ)
kmin(κ) ≥ kˆmin(κ) := D(c)
2
(
1− D(c)−Ko(κ)
2Kκ(κ)
)
.
3.4. The condition for proﬁtable collusion that is bound by the constraint
(stated in 3.2) is lower than the condition that identiﬁes if the collusive set
is not bound by the constraint (stated in 3.3) if
k¯min(κ) < kˆmin(κ)
D(c)
2
(
1− D(c)−Ko(κ)
Kκ(κ)
)
<
D(c)
2
(
1− D(c)−Ko(κ)
2Kκ(κ)
)
D(c)−Ko(κ)
Kκ(κ)
>
D(c)−Ko(κ)
2Kκ(κ)
1 >
1
2
which is true as long as D(c)−Ko(κ) ≥ 0.
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3.5. It is clear that for any unproﬁtable collusive set, that is a collusive set
for which kmin(κ) ≤ k¯min(κ), the constraint is always binding. Substituting
the discount factor for the capacity yields
c ≥ p¯ ≤ −K +Kκ(κ)δmin(κ) + a
b
c ≥ a−K
b
+
Kκ(κ)
b
2kmin(κ)
D(c)
.
We know that if kmin(κ) decreases, then p¯(κ) decreases because
∂p¯(κ)
∂kmin(κ)
>
0. The highest value that kmin(κ) can take is just the condition for a proﬁtable
collusive set itself. If kmin(κ) would be higher, then the collusion would not
be unproﬁtable. Substituting in the condition yields
c ≥ a−K
b
+
2Kκ(κ)
bD(c)
[
D(c)
2
(
1− D(c)−Ko(κ)
Kκ(κ)
)]
c ≥ a−K
b
+
K −D(c)
b
= c
which is always true.
4.1. Assume that at least one collusive set κ operates proﬁtably. If it is
the only proﬁtable collusive set, then it is internally and externally stable as
members of the collusive set have no incentive to deviate from the collusive
price and outside ﬁrms have no incentive to join in the collusion. If there
are several proﬁtable collusive sets, then the algorithm in D’Aspremont et al.
(1983, p. 22) assures the existence of a stable collusive set. We know that
all proﬁtable collusive sets, which consist of exactly two ﬁrms, are internally
stable as deviating from the collusive price would lead to the reversion to the
static Nash equilibrium with proﬁts of zero. If at least one of those sets is
externally stable, then a stable collusive set is found. If none of these sets are
externally stable, then all proﬁtable collusive sets of size three are internally
stable. Again, if at least one of those sets is also externally stable, then we
have found a stable collusive set. This procedure is repeated until we reach
the point where all ﬁrms collude – internally stable because of the use of the
algorithm and externally stable as no outside ﬁrm can join in the collusion.
Therefore, at least one stable collusive set must exist if there is to be at least
one proﬁtable collusive set.
18
5.1. k¯min(κ) in 3.4 describes the condition for which a collusive set operates
proﬁtably. Consider a merger between the ﬁrms m and a with m, a ∈ I to
ﬁrm ma ∈ ma ∪ I \ {m, a}. There are two ways in which a merger may
change the condition for a proﬁtable collusive set. First, let a, o ∈ κ with
ka > ko = kmin(κ) and m /∈ κ and o is another non-merging ﬁrm. The critical
capacity that is necessary for a proﬁtable collusive set lowers through this
merger if
D(c)
2
(
1− D(c)−Ko(κ)
Kκ(κ)
)
≥ D(c)
2
(
1− D(c)− (Ko(κ)− km)
Kκ(κ) + km
)
Kκ(κ)(D(c)− (Ko(κ)− km)) ≥ (Kκ(κ) + km)(D(c)−Ko(κ))
K ≥ D(c)
which is true by 2.4. If ko is suﬃciently close to the condition, then
post-merger collusion will be proﬁtable. For the second possibility let ﬁrms
a,m, o ∈ κ with km > kmin(κ \ a) = ko > kmin(κ) = ka. As kma > ka < ko,
kmin(κ) will increase post-merger either way. If ka is suﬃciently close to the
condition, then post-merger collusion will be proﬁtable.
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